Scholars have long maintained that Machiavelli's "The Prince" does not develop a single sustained argument but rather presents a set of disparate reflections; however, de Alvarez takes a different view. In "The Machiavellian Enterprise", he demonstrates that there is an internal consistency in "The Prince" built upon a key argument that has been previously overlooked. De Alvarez presents his bold and sophisticated argument in an accessible manner and incites debates and discussions that reshape the view of the western (...) tradition's most original political philosopher. (shrink)

In his private life, as well as in his work and political attitudes, Michel Foucault often stood in contradiction to himself, especially when his expansive ideas collided with the institutions in which he worked. In Francois Caillat's provocative collection of essays and interviews based on his French documentary of the same name, leading contemporary critics and philosophers reframe Foucault's legacy in an effort to build new ways of thinking about his struggle against society's mechanisms of domination, demonstrating how conflict within (...) the self lies at the heart of Foucault's life and work. (shrink)

Le corps humain est une réalité plurielle. En tant que tel, il est devenu un pôle de référence pour une nouvelle positivité. De tous les lieux d'expression et de récupération du corps, le sport est devenu le plus accaparant et le plus efficace. Le système sportif façonne le corps humain dans tous ses aspects et lui confère un statut nouveau, celui de corps sportif, ce nouveau paradigme des temps actuels.The human body is a multifaceted reality. As such, it has become (...) a reference pole for a new positivity. Among the various areas of corporeal expression and recuperation, sport has become the most absorbing and efficient. Sport as a system shapes the human body in all its aspects, and confers on it a new status: the "corps sportif" which is a new paradigm of our civilization. (shrink)

The Existentialist Reader is a comprehensive anthology of classic philosophical writings from eight key existentialist thinkers: Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, de Beauvoir, Jaspers, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and Ortega y Gasset. These substantial and carefully selected readings consider the distinctive concerns of existentialism: absurdity, anxiety, alienation, death. A comprehensive introduction by Paul S. MacDonald illuminates the existentialist quest for individual freedom and authentic human experience with insight into the historical and intellectual background of these major figures. The Existentialist Reader is a valuable (...) guide to the provocative theories that shook the philosophical world in the 1930s and continue to profoundly shape the way we think about ourselves. (shrink)

There is a long and successful scholarly tradition of commenting on Nietzsche’s deep affinity for the philosophy of Heraclitus. But scholars remain puzzled as to why he suggested at the end of his career, in Ecce Homo, that the doctrine he valued most, the eternal recurrence of the same, might also have been taught by Heraclitus. This essay aims to answer this question through a close examination of Nietzsche’s allusions to Heraclitus in his first published mention of eternal recurrence in (...) The Joyful Science and in a related set of notes from the period when he was formulating and defending his doctrine of eternal recurrence while writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The key to answering this question, it is argued, is that Nietzsche came to believe that the doctrine of eternal recurrence, when properly understood as requiring identical repetition, has to presuppose a Heraclitean reality of eternal, absolute, and universal flux. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Visionary Approach: Lynn A. De Silva and The Prospects for Buddhist-Christian Encounter ed. by Elizabeth J. Harris and Perry Schmidt-LeukelLeo D. LefebureA VISIONARY APPROACH: LYNN A. DE SILVA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER. Edited by Elizabeth J. Harris and Perry Schmidt-Leukel. Sankt Ottilien: EOS, 2021. 390 pp.This volume presents essays exploring the legacy of Lynn A. de Silva (1919–1982), a Methodist pastor and biblical scholar in (...) Sri Lanka who was an important pioneer of Buddhist-Christian studies. Most of the chapters are based on presentations at the conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies that met at the Benedictine Archabbey of St. Ottilien in 2019. Some of the authors, including Wesley Ariarajah, Aloysius Pieris, and Shantha de Silva (youngest son of Lynn de Silva), knew de Silva personally and offer warm tributes to his memory. Other authors work for institutions that carry on the types of projects that de Silva pioneered: Marshal Fernando is the Director of the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, which de Silva founded and directed from 1962–1982; Indunil J. Kodithuwakku Kankanamalage, who is from Sri Lanka, serves as the Secretary of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue; and Peniel Rajkumar leads the Interreligious Dialogue and Cooperation Programme of the World Council of Churches.Some authors examine how de Silva developed and modified his understanding of the relationship between Buddhist and Christian perspectives. In his early work in the 1960s, de Silva responded to Buddhist misunderstandings of Christian faith and practice. In the 1970s, he explored how Buddhist teachings could be related to biblical and Christian perspectives in ways that could enhance Christian faith. Toward the end of his life de Silva pondered the degree to which Buddhist and Christian perspectives could be relativized and harmonized.Benedictine Abbot Petrus Hohensteiger traces the development of de Silva's responses to Buddhist belief in reincarnation. De Silva came to reject traditional Protestant Christian eschatology that teaches that a single lifetime will be followed by eternal heaven or hell; but he also rejected Theravada belief in rebirth. Instead, while remaining a Protestant Christian, he developed a belief in purgatory that allowed for self-purification and growth in sanctity after death. De Silva interpreted Buddhist belief in rebirth and Christian belief in resurrection as symbolic pointers toward a single, shared truth of self-negating, self-emptying love.Andreas Nehring focuses on de Silva's study of Buddhism as a popular religion combining Buddhist perspectives with folk religious practices. Drawing on the critical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, Nehring emphasizes the ways in which de Silva's [End Page 403] sympathetic attention to folk Buddhism can shift the dialogue between Buddhists and Christians in positive ways. Gudrun Löwner explores how de Silva turned to visual art and aesthetics to promote mutual understanding between Buddhists and Christians. Amos Yong reflects on de Silva's pneumatological anthropology in conversation with Theravada Buddhists, mentioning the shared effort to find an alternative to eternalism or nihilism. While noting many points of convergence, Yong finds an important difference from Theravada anthropology in de Silva's eschatological interpretation of the corporate and resurrected Spiritual Body of the Apostle Paul.Kurt Gakuro Krammer reflects on how Buddhist-Christian dialogue can change one's understanding of the human being. Observing that most European Buddhists have thus far avoided dialogue, he proposes that de Silva can offer a helpful model of dialogical understanding but also poses the pointed question of whether dialogue has any soteriological impact, such as upon efforts toward social action. This volume is a very important contribution that will be of interest to all persons involved in Buddhist-Christian dialogue.Leo D. LefebureGeorgetown UniversityCopyright © 2022 University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

According to Lou Salomé, Nietzsche’s philosophy is essentially autobiographical and is best understood as a kind of personal confession, memoir, or self-portrait. In my view, however, this approach is radically mistaken and the textual evidence actually shows the opposite of what Salomé thinks. In these passages, Nietzsche is actually criticizing past philosophers for committing a falsifying cognitive error when they projected themselves and their personal prejudices into all of reality.

This article is concerned with three exceptional episodes in Descartes's life, each of which had a profound impact on the development of his thought; several arguments are advanced and new primary material uncovered to support our contentions. First, he did indeed visit Prague in November 1620 and his experiences there shaped his later views of mechanical automata, optical illusions, and the pseudosciences. Second, his encounter with the mysterious Sieur de Chandoux (identified here for the first time) in November 1628 shows (...) that Chandoux was not a reformer or a skeptic but a disguised cynic or erudite libertine. Third, he had close family connections with, and an informed report about, the demonic possessions of Loudun (near Poitiers) in 1634-36, and these shaped his version of the evil demon argument in the _Meditations. Through this argument and his 'new way of ideas' Descartes overthrew traditional notions about soul and mind, the status of the subject, and the evidence for truth. This permitted an understanding of the manner in which one can be an other for oneself and the manner in which certainty can be grounded with the 'objective' structures of consciousness. (shrink)

SINCE ITS PUBLICATION IN 1981, Alexandre Kojève’s Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit has received scant scholarly attention. Except for a brief note on the book by Michael S. Roth, and some scattered references here and there, the Esquisse has been eclipsed by Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel and by his debate and longstanding correspondence with Leo Strauss in the latter’s On Tyranny. Despite the renown of these two books, the Esquisse is an indispensable work in Kojève’s corpus as (...) a whole. As the Esquisse was written after the Introduction, Kojève clarifies and elaborates upon many of the themes he raises there; and as the Esquisse was written before his response to Strauss’s On Tyranny, it helps to set the stage for this important philosophic debate. Furthermore, the Esquisse is clearly Kojève’s most political work, by which I mean that he most fully articulates his understanding of right, justice, and the universal and homogeneous empire. The Esquisse is his only book that is not an interpretation of the history of philosophy and political thought, and this means that Kojève’s own voice can be heard with an unrivalled clarity: the oft asked question whether Kojève is sincerely attempting to interpret another philosopher or is masking his own thoughts behind that interpretation simply does not apply in this case. Although the title of the book states that it is a provisional exposition, the Esquisse is certainly more unified or systematic than the Introduction, and Kojève declared that he was satisfied with it. Lastly, the Esquisse is also a highly accessible work, not being as abstract as some of his other epistemological writings. All in all, it is extremely puzzling why political scientists have not paid more attention to the Esquisse. (shrink)

Part 1. FOUNDERS AND FIRSTCOMERS1: David Zimmerman: 'Protests Butter no Parsnips': Lord Beveridge and the Rescue of Refugee Academics from Europe, 1933-19382: William Lanouette: A Narrow Margin of Hope: Leo Szilard in the Founding Days of CARA3: Paul Weindling: From Refugee Assistance to Freedom of Learning: the Strategic Vision of A. V. Hill, 1933-19644: Gustav Born: Refugee Scientists in a New Environment5: Georgina Ferry: Max Perutz and the SPSLPART 2. TESS - THE LINCHPIN6: Paul Broda: Esther Simpson: A (...) Correspondence7: Lewis Elton: Eva and EstherPART 3. ASSOCIATES AND ALLIES8: Gerald Kreft: 'Dedicated to Represent the True Spirit of the German Nation in the World': Philipp Schwartz, Founder of the Notgemeinschaft9: Tibor Frank: Organized Rescue Operations in Europe and the United States, 1933-194510: Susan Cohen: In Defence of Academic Women Refugees: The British Federation of University Women11: Stina Lyon: Karl Mannheim and Viola Klein: Refugee Sociologists in Search of Social Democratic PracticePART 4. REVERSING THE GAZE12: Christian Fleck: Austrian Refugee Social Scientists13: Antoon de Baets: Plutarch's Thesis: The Contribution of Refugee Historians to Historical Writing, 1945-201014: Marina Yu Sorokina: Within Two Tyrannies: The Soviet Academic Refugees of the Second World War15: Antonín Kostlán and Soña Strbáñová: Czech Scholars in Exile, 1948-198916: Shula Marks: 'Bending the rules': South African Refugees in the UK, 1960-198017: Alan Phillips: Refugee Academics from Chile: WUS-SPSL CollaborationLucia Muñoz: Postscript. (shrink)

Nietzsche's use of metaphor has been widely noted but rarely focused to explore specific images in great detail. A Nietzschean Bestiary gathers essays devoted to the most notorious and celebrated beasts in Nietzsche's work. The essays illustrate Nietzsche's ample use of animal imagery, and link it to the dual philosophical purposes of recovering and revivifying human animality, which plays a significant role in his call for de-deifying nature.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs sniffing (...) one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

If Unamuno had been able to choose how to be remembered, he would have wanted him to be a poet. This book wants to do justice to that happy possibility. But above all because Unamuno was a poet in the highest sense: he was while writing the same essay as a novel, or theater, letter or verse, and he was also a poet when he passionately lived all the facets of his intense existence. His intellectual work was poetic and his (...) personal relationships, as well as his political activity, also responded to that peculiar Unamunian aesthetic in which the vital horizon is inescapably confused with the tasks of thought." --Translated from back cover. (shrink)

Educating the Virtues David Carr Routledge, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0?415?05746?9. £35. The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas By Leo J. Elders E. J. Brill, 1990. Pp. 332. ISBN 0?04?09156?4. $74.36. The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory By Milton Fisk Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. x + 391. ISBN 0?521?38966?6. £10.95 pbk. Perspectives on Language and Thought: Interrelations in Development Edited by S. A. Gelman and J. P. Byrnes Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 524. (...) ISBN 0?521?37497?9. £50. Aristotle's First Principles By T. H. Irwin Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xviii + 702. ISBN 0?198?24717?6. £17.50 Pbk. Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of Ethics By John Rajchman Routledge, 1991. Pp. 155. ISBN 0?415?90380?7. £10.99. Logical Forms By Mark Sainsbury Blackwell, 1991. Pp. 408. ISBN 0?631?17777?9. £11.95. Form and Transformation. A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus By Frederic M. Schroeder McGill?Queen's University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv + 136. ISBN 0?7735?1016?8. £34.95. Did The Greeks Believe Their Myths? An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination By Paul Veyne, translated by Paula Wissing The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. 161. ISBN 0?226?85434?5. £8.75 Pbk. What is Philosophy? By Dietrich von Hildebrand Routledge, 1991. Pp. lvii + 242. ISBN 0?415?02584?2. £12.99. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

We are far removed, in this section of the Encyclopedia on memory, from the mnemotechnic icons described by Francis Yates in The Art of Memory and much closer to Augustine's advice about how to remember and to psalmodize Scripture. Memory, for Hegel, is the learning by rote of names, or of words considered as names, and it can therefore not be separated from the notation, the inscription, or the writing down of these names. In order to remember, one is forced (...) to write down what one is likely to forget. The idea in other words, makes its sensory appearance, in Hegel, as the material inscription of names. Thought is entirely dependent on a mental faculty that is mechanical through and through, as remote as can be from the sounds and the images of the imagination or from the dark mine of recollection, which lies beyond the reach of words and of thought[…]No wonder, then, that Hegel's Aesthetics turns out to be a double and possibly duplicitous text. Dedicated to the preservation and the monumentalization of classical art, it also contains all the elements which make such a preservation impossible from the start. Theoretical reasons prevent the convergence of the apparently historical and the properly theoretical components of the work. This results in the enigmatic statements that have troubled Hegel's readers, such as the assertion that art is for us a thing of the past. This has usually been interpreted and criticized or, in some rare instances, praised as a historical diagnosis disproven or borne out by actual history. We can now assert that the two statements "art is for us a thing of the past" and "the beautiful is the sensory manifestation of the idea" are in fact one and the same. To the extent that the paradigm for art is thought rather than perception, the sign rather than the symbol, writing rather than painting or music, it will also be memorization rather than recollection. As such, it belongs indeed to a past which, in Proust's words, could never be recaptured, retrouve. Art is "of the past" in a radical sense, in that, like memorization, it leaves the interiorization of experience forever behind. It is of the past to the extent that it materially inscribes, and thus forever forgets, its ideal content. The reconciliation of the two main theses of the Aesthetics occurs at the expense of the aesthetic as a stable philosophical category. What the Aesthetics calls the beautiful terms turns out to be, also, something very remote from what we associate with the suggestiveness of symbolic form.Paul de Man, Sterling Professor of the Humanities at Yale University, is the author of Blindness and Insight and Allegories of Reading and is currently completing a book tentatively titled The Resistance to Theory. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Political Allegory in Rousseau", "The Epistemology of Metaphor", and "A Letter". (shrink)

Finally, our argument suggests that the relationship and the distinction between literature and philosophy cannot be made in terms of a distinction between aesthetic and epistemological categories. All philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is dependent upon figuration, to be literary and, as the depository of this very problem, all literature is to some extent philosophical. The apparent symmetry of these statements is not as reassuring as it sounds since what seems to bring literature and philosophy together is, (...) as in Condillac's argument about mind and object, a shared lack of identity or specificity. Contrary to common belief, literature is not the place where the unstable epistemology of metaphor is suspended by aesthetic pleasure, although this attempt is a constitutive moment of its system. It is rather the place where the possible convergence of rigor and pleasure is shown to be a delusion. The consequences of this lead to the difficult question whether the entire semantic, semiological, and performative field of language can be said to be covered by tropological models, a question which can only be raised after the proliferating and disruptive power of figural language has been fully recognized. Paul de Man, Tripp Professor in the humanities and chairman of the comparative literature department of Yale University, is the author of Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "Political Allegory in Rousseau," appeared in the Summer 1976 issue and appears in his book Allegories in Reading. (shrink)

This article examines Gerald Odonis' view on the nature of place as found in his commentary on the Sentences and in an anonymous question extant in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229. Both texts defend a thoroughly un-Aristotelian conception of place as three-dimensional space. Odonis not only deviates from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner surface of a surrounding body, but also from the positions of his contemporaries, including fellow Franciscans. Despite some remarkable doctrinal similarities between Odonis' view and that (...) of Renaissance innovators like Francesco Patrizi and Bernardino Telesio, it seems unlikely that Gerald played a role in the rise of new conceptions of place in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. An edition of the anonymous Quaestio de loco is given in an appendix. (shrink)

During the Corona pandemic, it became clear that people are vulnerable to potentially harmful nonhuman agents, as well as that our own biological existence potentially poses a threat to others, and vice versa. This suggests a certain reciprocity in our relations with both humans and nonhumans. In his The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty introduces the notion of the flesh to capture this reciprocity. Building on this idea, he proposes to understand our relationships with other humans, as well as those (...) with nonhuman beings as having a chiasmic structure: to sense, or perceive another entity in a particular way simultaneously implies to be sensed or perceived in a particular way by this other entity. In this paper, we show how a postphenomenological perspective expands on Merleau-Ponty: first, it more radically interprets Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh by not only considering it to be a medium that is the condition of possibility for vision but as pointing to the constitution of an intercorporeal field in which entities—both human and nonhuman—mutually sense one another. Second, it augments Merleau-Ponty’s thought by drawing attention to how technologies mediate chiasmic relations. This is clarified through the example of the facemask, which reveals the chiasmic structure of our relation with nonhuman entities, and shows that technologies co-constitute interpersonal relationships by making humans present to one another in a particular way. We suggest that these aspects are not unique to the facemask, but point to a general technologically mediated chiasmic structure of human-world relations. (shrink)

Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies and philosophy of technology have repeatedly stressed that scientific practices are collective practices that crucially depend on the presence of scientific technologies. Postphenomenology is one of the movements that aims to draw philosophical conclusions from these observations through an analysis of human–technology interactions in scientific practice. Two other attempts that try to integrate these insights into philosophy of science are Ronald Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism and Davis Baird’s Thing Knowledge. In this (...) paper, these two approaches will be critically discussed from the perspective of postphenomenology. We will argue that Giere and Baird problematically assume that scientific instruments have a determined function, and that all human members of a scientific collective have immediate access to this function. However, these assumptions also allow them to offer a clear answer to the question how scientists can collectively relate to scientific phenomena. Such an answer is not yet formulated within the postphenomenological perspective. By adding a postphenomenological touch to the semiotic approach in Actor-Network Theory, we offer an account of how different individual human–technology relations are integrated into larger scientific collectives. We do so by showing that scientific instruments not only help constitute scientific phenomena, but also the intersubjectivity within such collectives. (shrink)